From apple-watchman to billionaire: the criminal evolution of Aleksandr Feldman and his pocket conglomerate AVEC

00:09, 24.02.2017

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From apple-watchman to billionaire: the criminal evolution of Aleksandr Feldman and his pocket conglomerate AVEC

On the surface, he is a kind-hearted man who pets gazelles and feeds cupcakes to a little monkey, collects netsuke, sponsors children’s events, and regularly appears on television delivering instructive monologues. But why do people who have known Aleksandr Feldman for many years often describe him as a traitor and a deceiver who constantly sexually harasses his female assistants? And if that is the case, do residents of Ukraine’s second-largest city risk replacing Kernes with Feldman in the next election?

“Apples! Apples!”

Aleksandr Borisovich Feldman was born on January 6, 1960, in Kharkov. As he claims, he grew up in the “most ordinary” Soviet family. The family’s ordinariness stemmed from the fact that his parents did not hold high-ranking positions at the time. His mother, Ida Leibovna, worked in a kindergarten, first as a teacher and later as its director. His father, Boris Yakovlevich, was an engineer specializing in machine-tool manufacturing. It was his father who instilled in him the foundations of entrepreneurship. Not content with a single salary, Boris Yakovlevich sought additional sources of income wherever possible, while generally trying to stay within the boundaries of the law.

While Sasha attended School No. 31 in Kharkov, his parents did not place many demands on him. Only at the age of 14, during the summer holidays, did his uncle arrange a temporary job for him at a local post office. Feldman remembered the experience for the rest of his life as “hard and exhausting labor.” After that, all experiments with labor discipline came to an end, and Aleksandr Feldman’s memories of his school years remained entirely positive: good friends, cheerful adventures, and family trips to the seaside.

Feldman is almost the only Ukrainian oligarch “from the people” who does not complain about a “hungry Soviet childhood with wooden toys.” At the very least, he does not share the tradition among parts of the Ukrainian elite of portraying life in Ukraine before 1991 exclusively in dark and negative terms. Some observers explain this by describing Feldman as an “inept politician.”

After graduating from school, Aleksandr showed no desire to continue his education, and his parents did not insist on it. At the time, this was highly unusual, since even families in difficult circumstances generally tried to place their children in vocational training or factory apprenticeships. In Feldman’s case, nothing of the sort happened. The reasons behind this appear to have remained a family secret, as did the question of what the young Aleksandr did during the year between finishing school and being drafted into military service.

Some details about that period are known, however. He attended DOSAAF driving courses and, as a result, was assigned directly to a military motor transport unit when he entered the army. He served in Stryy, Lviv Region.

Soon after leaving the army, Sasha decided to become a taxi driver. At the time, the profession was considered highly prestigious because of the opportunity for unofficial earnings, and getting such a job was not easy. Thanks to the connections of his father and uncle, however, he was hired by Motor Transport Enterprise No. 20102, the second taxi depot in Kharkov.

Around the same period, he got married. His wife was Valeriya Vladimirovna, and soon they had a son, Aleksandr Feldman Jr.

Apparently, the salary and side income of a taxi driver were not enough for him, because a year later Aleksandr Feldman became involved in his first business venture. He sold apples and pears at Kharkov’s Konny Market, sourcing the fruit from the state farm named after the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He initially transported the produce using a state-owned Volga car and, after leaving the transport enterprise, relied on the vehicles of acquaintances.

At the state farm, the fruit cost him 50 kopecks per bucket, while at the market it sold for 30–40 kopecks per kilogram.

At the time, however, simple reselling could result in prosecution under the Soviet criminal offense of “speculation.” Feldman found a workaround: during the summer he formally registered either himself or his wife as a watchman in the state farm’s orchards. In practice, the job was performed by a drifter, while Feldman obtained the legal right to sell apples at the market as payment in kind for his labor.

SKELET-info reviewed the matter and found that even three decades later, Aleksandr Feldman continued to state in interviews that he had personally worked as an orchard watchman and had sold apples that he had honestly earned through his labor. This is hardly surprising, since even among fellow oligarchs—hardly known for honesty or integrity—Feldman has a reputation for being “insincere.”

While Sasha was attending School No. 31 in Kharkov, his parents did not put much pressure on him. Only at the age of 14, during the summer holidays, did his uncle arrange for him to work at a local post office, and he remembered the experience for the rest of his life as “hard, exhausting labor.” After that, all experiments with labor discipline for Sasha Feldman came to an end, so his memories of his school years remained exclusively positive: good friends, fun adventures, and family trips to the seaside. Feldman is almost the only Ukrainian oligarch “from the people” who does not complain about a “hungry Soviet childhood with wooden toys.” At the very least, he never supported the common habit among the Ukrainian elite of portraying life in Ukraine before 1991 as nothing but bleak and miserable. Some observers explain this by saying that Feldman has always been “an inept politician.”

After graduating from school, Aleksandr had no desire to pursue further education, and his parents did not insist on it. By the standards of the time, this was highly unusual, since even in the most troubled families parents tried to place their children somewhere, at least as apprentices in factories. In Feldman’s case, nothing of the sort happened. Apparently, the reason remained a family secret, just as the question of what young Aleksandr did during the year after graduation before he was drafted into the military. Some details of that period are known, however: he attended DOSAAF driving courses and, after being conscripted, was assigned directly to a military motor transport unit. He served in Stryi, in the Lvov Region.

Soon after leaving the army, Sasha decided to become a taxi driver. The profession was considered prestigious because of the opportunity to earn unofficial income, and getting such a job was not easy. Thanks to the connections of his father and uncle, however, he was hired by Motor Transport Enterprise No. 20102, the second taxi fleet in Kharkov. Around the same time, he got married to Valeriya Vladimirovna. Soon afterward, their son Aleksandr was born, later known as Aleksandr Feldman Jr.

Apparently, however, the salary and side income of a taxi driver were not enough for him. Within a year, Aleksandr Feldman launched his first business venture. He sold apples and pears at Kharkov’s Horse Market, sourcing the fruit from the state farm named after the 25th Congress of the CPSU. At first, he used a state-owned Volga car and later, after leaving the transport enterprise, relied on vehicles belonging to acquaintances. At the farm, fruit cost him 50 kopecks per bucket, while at the market it sold for 30–40 kopecks per kilogram.

At the time, however, simple resale could lead to prosecution for “speculation.” Feldman found a workaround. Every summer he officially registered either himself or his wife as caretakers of the state farm’s orchards. Some drifter reportedly performed the actual work, while Feldman gained the legal right to sell apples at the market, presenting them as payment in kind for his labor. SKELET-info verified that even three decades later Aleksandr Feldman continued to claim in interviews that he had genuinely worked as an orchard watchman and sold honestly earned apples. This is hardly surprising, considering that even among fellow oligarchs, who are not known for exceptional honesty, Feldman has long had a reputation for being insincere.

Feldman also tells a polished story about why he left the transport enterprise. According to his version, he was denied vacation leave, so he quit and went to Sochi with Valeriya, after which he was fired for absenteeism. Whatever actually happened, one fact remains: Aleksandr Feldman never again worked in his only formal profession as a driver. His employment record looked less like the biography of a conventional worker and more like the career path of either an aspiring rock star or a former repeat offender. Between 1982 and 1988, he was officially listed as a boiler operator, stoker, furniture upholsterer, repair mechanic, security guard, and even a delivery driver transporting baby food on a motor scooter. Yet old acquaintances recall seeing him not in boiler rooms but at Kharkov’s markets — the Central Market, Horse Market, and Sumy Market — where he had already become a major market operator.

The issue of “sincerity” resurfaced in 2015, when the media published another version of Aleksandr Feldman’s biography. This account claimed that during the 1980s he founded a company called Vesnyanka and worked tirelessly there as a carpenter and furniture maker. Every middle-aged and older resident of Kharkov, however, remembers that Vesnyanka was actually the name of a Soviet consumer services enterprise that had operated in the city since the 1970s, uniting a network of service centers, repair shops, tailoring studios, and hair salons under a single brand.

From AVEK to Barabashka

At the end of 1988, Boris Yakovlevich Feldman decided to abandon his low-profit engineering career and focus entirely on private business. He established the cooperative Montazhnik, which initially specialized in producing balcony and veranda glazing frames from scarce aluminum profiles and later expanded into a broad range of construction and renovation work. The Feldmans never explained how an ordinary Soviet engineer managed to secure premises, obtain equipment, source scarce materials, and launch such an enterprise. It is clear, however, that enthusiasm alone would not have been enough.

As Montazhnik expanded, Boris Yakovlevich brought his son in from the marketplace in 1989. According to the official biography, Aleksandr worked there tirelessly as an ordinary mechanic. Unofficial accounts suggest that he handled orders and supervised installation crews, while his father managed procurement and production. A year later, in 1990, Boris Yakovlevich founded another cooperative, the Remontnik auto service center. Unlike the makeshift garage workshops common at the time, this was a substantial enterprise operating from a leased Soviet repair facility. After several months officially employed as a mechanic, Aleksandr Feldman became chairman of the board, effectively receiving his first major business from his father. The same can be said of the enterprises that followed, since the foundation of Aleksandr Feldman’s initial capital consisted entirely of businesses created by Boris Yakovlevich, where he alternated between managerial roles and nominal positions as an ordinary employee.

At the same time, Aleksandr Feldman never abandoned market trading. In the early 1990s, he controlled sales points at all major clothing markets in Kharkov. Yet he no longer saw major prospects in trade itself. Instead, he became interested in leasing and subleasing market stalls to other merchants.

During the spring and summer of 1991, he served as a site manager at another of his father’s enterprises, Sigma. In September and October of that year, the Feldman family businesses were consolidated into the production and commercial company Autoexpresskonstruktsiya (AVEK), with Aleksandr Feldman appointed as director. This marked the beginning of Feldman’s rise as an oligarch. The foundation of the family’s business empire became AVEK, and later, in 1994, the concern AVEK & Co., which incorporated AVEK, Vento, Alternativa, AVEK-S, Alkad, Rostra, and later the agricultural enterprise Druzhba.

According to unofficial information obtained by SKELET-info, the establishment of AVEK immediately after the failed GKChP coup and the dissolution of the CPSU was linked to the transfer of Communist Party assets into commercial structures. Boris Yakovlevich Feldman maintained business ties with Yevhen Kushnaryov, formerly the second secretary of the city party committee and later head of the city council, as well as with Oleh Taranov, the future father-in-law of Yevhen Murayev. At the same time, the Feldmans had contacts with Aleksandr Yaroslavsky, son-in-law of Kharkov Regional Council Chairman Aleksandr Maselsky. Relations between these figures were unequal, however. Boris Feldman was neither a major official nor a shadow-economy boss. He was a mid-level cooperative entrepreneur who regularly sought support from more influential figures. As a result, the Feldmans did not participate in the first major business projects of Taranov, Kushnaryov, and Maselsky, such as the Ukrainian-Siberian Investment Corporation, coal and gas trading, or industrial privatization. Instead, they focused on collecting whatever opportunities fell from the tables of larger players, steadily accumulating capital and expanding their connections. Those “crumbs,” however, often turned out to be substantial pieces, and the Feldman business expanded rapidly throughout the early 1990s despite hyperinflation.

In fact, it was the conflict between Kushnaryov and Maselsky over control of Kharkov’s Central Market that gave the Feldman family its golden opportunity. The compromise between the two power brokers was the creation of a new large clothing market that would pay taxes into the city budget, unlike the Central Market, whose taxes went to the regional budget. Ownership would be shared among people connected to both factions. The implementation of the project was entrusted to the Feldmans, likely because they were dependent on both groups. This also suggests that by the mid-1990s the Feldmans already had a strong reputation as “market kings,” although their official biographies make no mention of it.

The site selected for the new market was the area surrounding Akademika Barabashova metro station, where an informal marketplace had existed since the early 1990s and a commercial pavilion had appeared in 1995. Significant funding was allocated to AVEK for clearing the marshy wasteland and preparing the site: 50 billion karbovanets from the city budget, equivalent to roughly $140,000 at the time, plus a loan from UkrSibBank, the size of which was never disclosed. In 1996, the new market opened under the name Barabashovo, later nicknamed “Barabashka” by locals. From the moment it began operations, it expanded rapidly in every direction.

Barabashovo Market

The Bloody “Barabashka”

Visitors to large marketplaces often have no idea that many of them were built on the ruins of their founders and employees. From the moment it opened, Barabashovo may have been linked to the sudden death of Aleksandr Maselsky, who died on April 12, 1996, reportedly from a ruptured aorta. His death was surrounded by numerous rumors and unanswered questions, including allegations that Yevhen Kushnaryov and the Feldman family deprived Maselsky of his share in the Barabashovo project.

Less than forty days after his death, a major struggle over Maselsky’s legacy began in Kharkov. The controlling stake in UkrSibBank ultimately went to his son-in-law, Aleksandr Yaroslavsky, who later divorced Maselsky’s daughter. While Kushnaryov and Taranov fought over their portions of Maselsky’s business empire, the Feldmans secured ownership of the still relatively small and little-known Barabashovo market.

The controlling stake in the market was transferred to the AVEK concern, which was also the market’s founding entity, while operational management was assigned to the company Kharopttorg, whose founder and owner was the same AVEK concern.

According to unofficial information, Yevhen Kushnaryov and his son-in-law Aleksandr Kaganovsky also held a stake in AVEK, while their share of Barabashovo’s profits reportedly reached 30 percent.

Aleksandr Feldman and Yevhen Kushnaryov, photo from the old press

It is therefore not surprising that Kushnaryov provided the new market with full patronage. Already on June 1, 1996, by order of the city authorities, all retail rows of the Central Market (the largest clothing market at the time) were mandatorily relocated to Barabashovo. In addition, the new market received a one-year tax holiday, and the city council also “sold” it a two-story mansion, which became the headquarters of the market management, for just one million coupon-karbovanets (6 dollars).

The most important role in the market’s development was played by the creation of wholesale clothing trading areas that attracted shuttle traders from across eastern Ukraine. Thanks to this, Barabashovo began to grow at an extraordinary pace: by the end of the 1990s it covered about 30 hectares and continued expanding.

However, Barabashovo expanded not only across a swampy wasteland, but also to the detriment of residents of the nearby private-sector areas of Tyurenka and Rashkina Dacha. They were offered voluntary relocation from their homes and land plots in exchange for compensation of 20–25 thousand dollars.

However, even here there was a scheme involved. First, the money was allocated from the city budget (thanks to Kushnaryov), and second, the relocated residents could not even physically receive it. Citing another decision of the city executive committee stating that these plots could not be sold due to the land not yet being privatized, the owners were given apartments from the city housing fund instead — old, poorly renovated Khrushchev-era flats.

The renovation of these apartments was carried out by Boris Feldman’s companies, which for 5–8 thousand dollars simply wallpapered the walls and laid cheap linoleum. Ultimately, the expropriated land plots were transferred into the ownership of AVEK.

Those who hesitated too long about relocation or tried to negotiate had to endure months of terror. It began with night visits from grim men in sportswear, who at the time were not yet called “titushky.” Whether they were recruited by Feldman after the opening of Barabashovo or were his old acquaintances from his 1980s market business remains unclear.

Then, during the day, the gates and doors were broken down by the tax police, who claimed that residents were “illegally earning income” by providing parking spaces and storage areas for market traders and customers. After the tax authorities, racketeers began to appear, demanding a “share of the profits.”

Finally, security personnel from Barabashovo (a private security firm owned by AVEK) began demanding money from residents simply for driving past the market to their own homes.

A warning to the most stubborn residents was the tragic fate of a homeowner on Tolstoy Street, whose property was surrounded by the expanding market. One night, he allegedly shot his mother with a hunting rifle, set the house on fire, and then killed himself. Police and prosecutors insisted on this version and closed the case immediately.

Ukrainian law enforcement also failed to find those responsible for the death of Member of Parliament Yury Kononenko (Yabloko faction), a well-known Kharkiv businessman and owner of the large Losk auto market, who died on January 22, 2001, in his office. A hunting rifle was also found near him, and the prosecutor’s office stated that the cause of death was an accident due to careless handling of a weapon.

However, his death caused a public scandal, especially after his party colleague Mykhailo Brodskyi raised concerns. It emerged that since the late 1990s Kononenko had been receiving persistent offers to integrate his Losk market into the AVEK concern as a shareholder — effectively transferring control of his business.

In autumn 2000, when Kushnaryov was appointed governor of Kharkiv region, these proposals became even more aggressive. Kononenko fell into depression. His Losk market began to face pressure from police inspections, with criminal investigation officers demanding documents for used spare parts. Tax inspections followed. Inspectors openly hinted that the pressure would stop if sellers moved from Losk to Barabashovo.

Yuriy Kononenko

Constant “scamming” of trading entrepreneurs became a tradition of Barabashovo, and it was always justified by reconstructions and redevelopment. The most common schemes were as follows.

The first scheme: entrepreneurs paid for the construction of pavilions or “containers”, and were even forced to buy several shares in AVEK, but at the same time they were required to sign a contract under which the paid-for premises were transferred to the management of Kharopttorg structures — and then rented back to them.

The second scheme: traders were periodically “relocated” from busy, profitable locations to remote, undesirable areas, after which they were charged fees for the right to remain in their original spot or to receive a better one. Double bookkeeping became standard practice for the market administration.

A separate topic at Barabashovo is the Vietnamese community, which formed a large diaspora there, controlled by a certain “authority” named Le Minh Hieu. In 1989 he fled Vietnam (where he was immediately wanted for robbery and weapons possession), lived in Moscow where he changed his surname from Hieu to Duc, and in 1996 moved to Kharkov, where he became director of LLC VINAMEC and deputy head of the Vietnamese community association. In practice, he acted as the leader of a Vietnamese criminal group controlling and exploiting his compatriots.

A mutually beneficial cooperation quickly developed between Le Minh Duc and Aleksandr Feldman: he helped Feldman “maintain order” in the Vietnamese quarter of Barabashovo and handle certain city-level dealings, while Feldman protected him from law enforcement and helped create an image of a “respected entrepreneur.” At one point, Aleksandr Feldman even proposed awarding Le Minh Duc the title of honorary citizen of Kharkov.

War with the metro system

Barabashovo is not only located near the exits of Akademika Barabashova metro station, attracting tens of thousands of visitors daily, but has also expanded above the tunnels of the metro system itself. Over time, this caused water leaks and soil subsidence, leading to a long-running conflict between the market administration and the metro authorities, which reached its peak in 2007–2008.

Confident in his political influence (at the time he was a member of the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and enjoyed full support from Prime Minister Tymoshenko), Aleksandr Feldman attempted to win the conflict “in one move” by appointing his own person, Gennadiy Kimovich Bronshpak, as head of the Kharkov Metro system.

The cynicism of the situation was that Bronshpak had worked in the AVEK concern since 1996, initially as head and founder of the Ukrainian-Russian Trade and Industrial Company “KharkovSibInvest,” whose office was registered at the same address as AVEK (Sumskaya 70, a former kindergarten building). Through KharkovSibInvest, he was also linked to projects associated with SibInvest (one of Maselsky and Kushnaryov’s structures), suggesting he may have represented Kushnaryov’s interests within AVEK.

From 2003, Bronshpak headed AVEK as acting president, then president and chairman of the supervisory board, and from 2006 he served as a regional council deputy.

Hennadiy Bronshpak

In 2008, Bronshpak was presented as a candidate for the position of head of the Kharkov Metro system. His candidacy was nominated by the head of the Kharkov Regional State Administration, Arsen Avakov. Whether this was a result of shared business interests between Feldman and Avakov remains unclear. It may also have been simply support for a political ally: Avakov at the time was a member of “Nasha Ukraina,” while Feldman, as already mentioned, was aligned with the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc.

However, the then Minister of Transport, Iosif Vinsky, expressed doubts about Bronshpak’s professional qualifications, as he held only a degree in electrical engineering and a PhD thesis in… cheesemaking.

At that time, a so-called “Free Trade Union of Train Operators” appeared in the Kharkov Metro system, organizing protests and hunger strikes against the then-head, Sergey Museev. On February 14, 2008, Vinsky appointed Bronshpak as acting head of the Kharkov Metro system.

Bronshpak began his work by closing access to the administration building for journalists and metro employees (except office staff). In response, another train operators’ union demanded his removal, and the situation reached President Yushchenko.

On February 19, 2008, Museev was reinstated by a district court decision. However, in March a new order from the Ministry of Transport confirmed Bronshpak’s authority, and the administration building of the Kharkov Metro was stormed by AVEK security guards.

The climax of the conflict was an attack on the deputy head of the metro, Sergey Pochepetsky, who supported Museev. Unknown individuals severely beat him, fracturing his skull. The high-profile events forced the Ministry of Transport in September 2008 to accept the decision of the Supreme Court of Ukraine, which reinstated Sergey Museev.

Elephants, football, and pills

Aleksandr Feldman has loved animals since childhood, possibly even more than people. In school, he kept fish and brought home stray puppies and kittens, and when he grew up and acquired his first house, he filled the yard with dogs. He now runs his own kennel, keeps a monkey in his office, participates in an international program for the rescue of laboratory primates, and finances a bird rehabilitation center. Since the late 1990s he has been a sponsor of the Kharkov Zoo and founded his own “Feldman Ecopark,” where animals live without cages in open areas. All of this looks very kind and positive, but even here there is no shortage of Feldman’s characteristic “scheming.”

In 2000, the “AVEC” charitable foundation organized a fundraising campaign to purchase a new elephant for the Kharkov Zoo. Many people contributed, and Feldman’s contribution may have been the largest (no reports were published), but when the elephant Tendi arrived at the zoo, he presented and publicized it in the media as a gift to the city from “AVEC,” omitting all other participants in the campaign. The same situation repeated in 2006, when a lion cub named Athos was purchased for the zoo.

A rather unflattering story also emerged during the creation of the “Eco Park,” which in 2013 he could not resist renaming “Feldman Eco Park.” The issue is that along with the lands of the Derhachi District Administration and the Ukrainian Forestry Institute, two children’s health camps, “Yunost” and “Solnechnaya Polyana,” were also incorporated into the Eco Park project. In addition, several hectares of virgin forest around the Eco Park were brutally cleared to make space for a parking area. Finally, there have long been rumors that Feldman launched the Eco Park in order to privatize these 140 hectares of land on the outskirts of Kharkov. The memory of the earlier case is still fresh, when Feldman and his relatives received 5 hectares of land in 1996–2006 in the Sokolniki area of Kharkov “for personal farming.” He built a spacious estate there, and when journalists asked questions, he replied that chickens were walking in his yard and there was a potato patch—therefore, the land was being used for its intended purpose.

And with the well-known Kharkov FC «Metalist», Aleksandr Feldman was completely “insincere”. His investment in football, to which he was openly indifferent, was driven by the nationwide trend of the time: first in Kyiv, and then in regional centers, politicians and oligarchs suddenly became interested in football. Since 1998, the deputy mayor of Kharkov, Vladimir Babaev (who effectively ran the city in the absence of Kushnarev), and who closely worked with Feldman, served as chairman of the Kharkov Football Association. Apparently, he was the one who suggested that Feldman acquire FC «Metalist» as additional promotion ahead of the upcoming elections. Feldman agreed, serving from 1999 to 2004 as the owner and honorary president of the club. Nothing worthwhile came of it: while other oligarchs who genuinely loved football invested tens or even millions in their teams, Feldman was reluctant to spend money and, according to rumors, even tried to use the club for “grey” commercial schemes. As a result, «Metalist» declined and was sold to Aleksandr Yaroslavskiy — who understood not only football but also the importance of football fans, especially «ultras».

Feldman also did not succeed in the pharmaceutical business: at one point he was a co-owner of the Kharkov pharmaceutical company «Zdorovye», which united the Kharkov enterprises «Zdorovye», «Zdorovye Naroda», and the Experimental Plant of GNCLS, as well as the Kyiv-based «Pharmex» plant. The result of Feldman’s involvement: the quality of «Zdorovye» products fell so low that many pharmacy customers refused to buy its tablets and injections. A similar fate befell the privatized OJSC «Velykoburluk Cheese Plant», which «AVEC» owned through the Cypriot offshore company «Stefford Enterprises Limited» and was managed by the “cheese-maker–metro builder” Gennadiy Bronshpak. Far more successful were the Feldman family’s bread projects: CJSC «Khleb», LLC TD «Kharkivkhlib», OJSC «Karavai», through which they controlled up to half of the Kharkov bread market. However, when flour prices began to rise in 2006, he sold most of his shares. According to Feldman, he had no desire to maintain a “social price” for bread and incur losses — but he also did not want to engage in fraud by reducing the weight of bakery products.

Feldman vs everyone

Being elected in 2002 to the Verkhovna Rada from single-mandate constituency No. 175 (Oktiabrsky District of Kharkov), Aleksandr Feldman joined the pro-presidential bloc «For a United Ukraine». In 2004, he even served as an authorized representative of candidate Viktor Yanukovych in Kharkov: later he boasted that it was thanks to him that Yanukovych received 73% in the region. But as soon as the first Maidan gathered in Kyiv, the parliamentary coalition collapsed, and Feldman quickly moved to the politically neutral parliamentary group «Democratic Initiatives», where Mykhailo Dobkin was already present. In May 2005, Aleksandr Feldman joined the BYuT faction. He justified his decision by saying he had wanted to join the Socialist Party, but there were too many antisemites there.

This abrupt political shift was accompanied by another development: the breakdown of the close Feldman–Kushnarev alliance. It occurred immediately after Kushnarev lost his position as governor and came under the scrutiny of the new authorities as a “separatist” due to his idea of a federal Ukraine. Unexpectedly, Feldman published an article in his newspaper «Vremya» that sharply criticized Kushnarev’s “methods of work”. Later, when Kushnarev was arrested in August 2005 and Kharkov oligarchs contributed money for his bail, Aleksandr Feldman refused to provide funds. A few years later, after Kushnarev’s death “during a hunting trip,” Mykhailo Dobkin published an article in «Obozrevatel», calling Feldman a traitor to both Kushnarev and his voters, as well as to «Metalist», and referring to him in a clearly negative way as a “Chabadnik”. This was highly unusual: Mykhailo Dobkin himself is of full Jewish heritage. What was the reason?

Back in the early 1990s, representatives of the Ukrainian «Chabad» community (based in Dnipropetrovsk) approached Kushnarev, searching across the country for successful Jewish businessmen. Kushnarev introduced the «Chabad» representatives to the Feldmans, the Dobkins, and other successful Jews of Kharkov, but only the Feldmans engaged with «Chabad»—and even then only with expectations of mutual benefit. Thus Aleksandr Feldman soon became president of the Jewish Foundation of Ukraine, the Kharkov Regional Council of Jewish Organizations, the Kharkov Regional United Jewish Community, and the Association of National and Cultural Associations of Ukraine.

During this period, he entered into a deep conflict with Kharkov rabbi Eduard Khodos, the leader of the Kharkov Jewish community of the “Reformist” (liberal) branch. The main point of their conflict was the Kharkov Choral Synagogue: restored in 1990, it was under Khodos’s control, but in 1992 representatives of «Chabad», supported by Kushnarev and involving Boris and Aleksandr Feldman, began contesting its control. The conflict lasted for several years and not only split the Kharkov Jewish community but also gained international attention. The losing side, Eduard Khodos, became such an uncompromising opponent of «Chabad» that he devoted himself to writing numerous “anti-Chabad” books and articles, which critics often describe as antisemitic.

Eduard Khodos

Dobkin’s article was only a prelude to an offensive against Feldman: it began at the end of 2007, carried out by the Dobkin–Kernes duo, who fully controlled Kharkov’s city administration and used all available resources — even the municipal water utility. What motivated Mykhailo Dobkin in this case cannot be stated, but Gennadiy Kernes clearly aimed to take over «Barabashovo» — which by that time had expanded to 68 hectares. The market, where nearly 15,000 entrepreneurs worked (the largest in Europe), generated enormous revenues that were never precisely disclosed officially. Aleksandr Feldman’s fortune at the time was estimated at 224 million dollars, although he himself claimed that shares in «Barabashovo» were worth at least one billion. In addition, Feldman controlled and sought to fully take over the Central, Horse, and Sumy markets of Kharkov — which also attracted Kernes’s attention.

Feldman could rely only on the support of Governor Avakov (at the time a member of «Our Ukraine») and Prime Minister Tymoshenko. This was sufficient for defense, but not for offense — as demonstrated by Feldman’s conflict with the Kharkov Metro system (supported by Dobkin). The most ironic aspect was that, in public, this conflict was portrayed as a struggle between the “orange” and “pro-Ukrainian” Feldman and the “pro-Russian regionalists” Dobkin and Kernes — and both sides immediately gained politically motivated supporters and opponents.

A truce between them came in early 2009, when trade at «Barabashovo» sharply declined and Feldman made concessions to Kernes on other positions. Dobkin officially stated that “positive trends in the economic sphere had emerged,” although he did not specify which ones (it was said that Feldman transferred the Horse and Sumy markets to them). Interestingly, after this the Feldman family restructured their capital, transferring shares in «Barabashovo» from corporate entities to individuals: Boris Yakovlevich Feldman, Ida Leibovna Feldman, Valeriya Feldman, Gennadiy Bronshpak, Sergey Semochkin, and Pavel Svitailo (vice presidents of the «AVEC» concern), Viktor Larchenko (chairman of the supervisory board), and Matvey Golshteyn (director).

After Yulia Tymoshenko’s defeat in the 2010 presidential election, Feldman, elected to the Rada on the BYuT list, hesitated for a long time to leave the “losing team,” until in June of that year Tymoshenko herself removed him — accusing him of betrayal and collusion with the Party of Regions. Aleksandr Feldman continued negotiations and in March 2011 joined the Party of Regions faction. His accession to the regionalists was sharply accelerated by an attempt to seize «Barabashovo» by Yuriy Ivanyushchenko (“Yura Yenakievskiy”), who developed an unusual tactic: with the help of Kharkov nationalists (VO «Svoboda» and «Patriot of Ukraine»), they began harassing the Vietnamese community of Kharkov, which was one of the pillars of «Barabashovo» and one of Feldman’s most reliable sources of income from the market. Claiming that the Vietnamese were violating immigration laws, dealing drugs, and attacking Ukrainian women, the nationalists began conducting “public raids” on Vietnamese dormitories. This continued until 2012, and Feldman even appealed to the Government of Israel in search of protection.

The truce between Feldman and Dobkin proved stable: after becoming governor of Kharkov (2010–2014), Mykhailo Markovych not only honored the agreements but also lobbied Feldman’s interests (in particular, allocating land for the «Ecopark»). However, after the second Maidan, Dobkin moved into parliamentary opposition, and Kernes, who remained in charge of the city, not only survived an assassination attempt but also received an unpleasant surprise: Aleksandr Feldman announced his intention to run for mayor of Kharkov in the 2015 elections. Although Feldman later abandoned the idea, the conflict between them flared up again. Kernes, having recovered from his injury and the elections, showed his strength and once again set his sights on «Barabashovo». He used the same old set of tools against Feldman: municipal services, law enforcement agencies, and nationalists (as Kernes somehow managed to mobilize them), who once again began targeting the Vietnamese community. Afterwards, several large fires occurred at «Barabashovo».

In 2016–2017, the conflict escalated further after both Kharkov oligarchs became heavily involved in politics. Aleksandr Feldman became one of the leaders of the party «Our Land», described as a Bankova project aimed at siphoning votes away from the «Opposition Bloc». Kernes, meanwhile, secured the support of Kharkov «Solidarity», helping it oppose the «Petro Poroshenko Bloc» in the city council, while simultaneously establishing contacts with other political forces. At the same time, rumors that Aleksandr Feldman was being considered in Kyiv as one of the likely presidential candidates for the position of the new mayor of Kharkov were becoming increasingly widespread.

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