Absolute impunity of “Borman”: how Mekhti Mamedov legalized millions from racketeering and built a criminal empire

23:53, 09.09.2021

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Absolute impunity of “Borman”: how Mekhti Mamedov legalized millions from racketeering and built a criminal empire

Corrupt Official, “Fixer” and Drug Baron at the Doorstep of the Kazakh President’s Residence

The name of Mekhti Bakhadurovich Mamedov means little to Russian readers. Due to the highly specific nature of his activities and his circle of acquaintances, he avoids publicity in Russia. Meanwhile, this man, in his early forties, controls the transit of Afghan drugs into Russia, has built a powerful corruption network in Kazakhstan and neighboring countries, and, according to sources, has in recent years become “on friendly terms” with the family of Nursultan Nazarbayev himself. The secret behind such remarkable success of this Central Asian mafia figure is simple — he knows how to build relationships. He is particularly skilled at cultivating ties with prosecutors, security services, and ordinary criminals. He also never forgets to record on camera and audio devices his generous gifts, favors, and candid conversations with his associates. Drug trafficking, corporate raiding, bribery, blackmail, extortion, and child abductions — all of this appears in the biography of the subject of this investigation.

Corruption in Uniforms and Robes

Mamedov, an ethnic Azerbaijani, grew up in the city of Syrdarya in the Uzbek SSR, where he took his first steps in business. These steps were closely tied to the criminal environment, because becoming the director of a large restaurant and later a supplier of vehicles from AvtoVAZ in those days was extremely difficult. In 2004, after his business partner was murdered and the business was reportedly taken over by Uzbek security services, Mamedov left Uzbekistan and renounced his Uzbek citizenship. It was rumored that he obtained Kazakh citizenship illegally. In 2006, the KNB Department for the South Kazakhstan region initiated an investigation into how he obtained citizenship. The facts indicating illegal acquisition of citizenship were established, however, with the assistance of employees of the South Kazakhstan prosecutor’s office, he managed to avoid consequences, because by then our protagonist already knew whom he needed to befriend and do business with.

The first person Mamedov “recruited” in Kazakhstan was Vladimir Ivanovich Nakisbayev, head of the KNB Department for the South Kazakhstan region. Mamedov gave him cars, expensive gifts, and paid for overseas trips for Nakisbayev’s family. It was Nakisbayev who assisted Mamedov in illegally obtaining a Kazakh citizen’s passport. After some time, Nakisbayev was already under Mamedov’s control, and his influence extended to personnel decisions within the KNB Department, followed by the use of the operational capabilities of KNB personnel in Mamedov’s interests.

Having gained such influential allies, Mamedov moved into corporate raiding. One of his first victims were entrepreneurs Olimzhan Irismetov and Kairat Pazylbekov, owners of the “MEREKE” supermarket in Shymkent, South Kazakhstan region. It was from this supermarket, allegedly seized by Mamedov, that officials of the prosecutor’s office, courts, and financial police were later supplied with food products and expensive alcohol free of charge.

Through Nakisbayev, Mamedov established contacts with employees of the KNB central office and heads of departments in other regions. Mamedov’s raiding business expanded, and connections with employees of the prosecutor’s office, financial police, courts, and the KNB played a key role in it. The scheme was very simple. Mamedov, allegedly fearing nothing, would approach a businessman and inform him that certain problems were about to arise. He would say that he had information and that he could resolve these issues through any law enforcement agency. If the entrepreneur refused, an illegal criminal prosecution would be initiated, involving the fabrication of a criminal case and the subsequent seizure of company assets or property. Today, Mamedov controls large sums of money and property obtained through corporate raiding schemes. He is also accused of helping legalize the property of his accomplices. Dozens of businessmen in Kazakhstan have already suffered from attacks by this group.

In his corporate raiding schemes, Mamedov used former Deputy Head of the KNB Department for Almaty S. Asainov, who was accused of abuse of office and exceeding official authority, and was sentenced by the Military Court of the Almaty Garrison under Article 380, Part 2 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan to six years in a general-regime prison. At the same time, Mamedov recruited and worked with operatives. In the Almaty KNB Department, this included the head of the 5th Directorate, Serikov, who, allegedly acting on Mamedov’s instructions and based on anonymous complaints, initiated operational cases without sufficient grounds in order to place the phones of businessmen and Mamedov’s clients under surveillance, organize external monitoring, and subsequently transfer all operational information to Mamedov, who stored copies of the intelligence materials at a safe apartment.

Mamedov was acquainted with practically all key figures in the General Prosecutor’s Office, from deputy prosecutors general to department heads, and maintained close relations with them. Mamedov met Deputy Prosecutor General M.A. Zhorgenbayev during the latter’s tenure as regional prosecutor in South Kazakhstan, through former Deputy Regional Prosecutor Zh. Ospanov (currently Deputy Chairman of the Customs Committee of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan) and E.Zh. Yeraliev (currently Head of the Justice Department of Almaty). During that period, Mamedov allegedly documented Zhorgenbayev receiving bribes, as well as his time spent together with former Chairman of the South Kazakhstan Regional Court Barpibayev in private saunas and apartments. After a conflict with Zhorgenbayev (who limited his communication with Mamedov and stopped allowing him access), Mamedov handed over compromising materials and evidence of alleged abuses by Deputy Prosecutor General Zhorgenbayev to Prosecutor General of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kairat Mami. The video recordings reportedly showed Zhorgenbayev receiving bribes and other facts compromising certain employees of the General Prosecutor’s Office and the Supreme Court.

No internal investigation was conducted into these facts, and the Prosecutor General transferred Zhorgenbayev to the position of prosecutor in Astana. At the direction of K. Mami, the compromising materials were handed over to the security service of the General Prosecutor’s Office. At the same time, it should be taken into account that within Kazakhstan’s political elite, Prosecutor General K. Mami was considered an appointee of the head of the presidential administration, Kalmyrzayev, with all the resulting consequences. (By placing his people in key positions, Kalmyrzayev sought to strengthen his influence within Nazarbayev’s inner circle.) He was also regarded as a powerful figure uniting representatives of the “southern” faction. In particular, there was an opinion that Kalmyrzayev was behind the leak of compromising materials against T. Kulibayev and President Nazarbayev to the disgraced Kazakh oligarch M. Ablyazov. Connections between members of Kalmyrzayev’s team and former Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s former son-in-law Rakhat Aliyev were also reportedly traced.

Mamedov developed particularly close relations with Marat Akhmetzhanov, Chairman of a committee within the General Prosecutor’s Office, a former prosecutor in South Kazakhstan, and a relative of Justice Minister R.T. Tusupbekov, through whom he was introduced to Mamedov. Akhmetzhanov allegedly organized calls and promoted cases, exerting pressure by using his position and connections throughout the law enforcement system. Other participants in Mamedov’s schemes were also active in defending his interests, including Almaty Prosecutor Amirkhan Yestayev (former Deputy Prosecutor of South Kazakhstan), Almaty Deputy Prosecutor T.K. Suleimenov, Almaty Deputy Prosecutor Maksat Kozhabayev, and Almaty Justice Department Head E.Zh. Yeraliev (former Deputy Prosecutor in South Kazakhstan). The latter was appointed Head of the Almaty Justice Department as a nominee of Akhmetzhanov and Mamedov. This was Mamedov’s inner circle, on which he could always rely. Through the connections of these prosecutors, he gained access to various law enforcement agencies, where they arranged calls and requests for support.

There are also people loyal to Mamedov among the judiciary. These include the Chairman of the Almaty City Court, T. Barpibaev, whom he “tied” to himself back in Shymkent and met through Deputy Prosecutor General Zhorgenbayev. Barpibaev allegedly forces judges to issue knowingly unlawful verdicts and decisions in Mamedov’s favor. Barpibaev is believed to be heavily indebted to his patron. Employees of the city court say that Mamedov often shouted at the “boss”; according to them, they repeatedly heard Mamedov’s hysterical outbursts while he was in Barpibaev’s office. Through Barpibaev, Mamedov allegedly resolves almost all issues in the Supreme Court. With the direct assistance of Almaty prosecutor A. Yestayev, Mamedov established close corrupt ties with M. Duisenov, head of the Almaty Department for Combating Economic and Corruption Crimes, and his deputy Yerzhan Ibraimov, who allegedly helped organize the fabrication of criminal case materials and the unlawful prosecution of entrepreneurs.

Financial matters

At the central office of the Financial Police, Mamedov secured support from S. Ongarbayev, who was one of the service’s deputy chairmen. Several businessmen are named as individuals whom Mamedov attempted to blackmail with the involvement of Financial Police officers, forcing some of them to pay large sums of money. These include Raimbek Batalov, Zeki Pilge (“Turkuaz”), Kairat Boranbayev (“KazRosGas”), and others. In all these cases, Mamedov and his associates used a well-established scheme of illegally seizing other people’s property through falsification of criminal case materials.

One of Mamedov’s financial schemes involved the embezzlement of funds from BTA Bank, with the direct assistance and participation of the bank’s former owner, Mukhtar Ablyazov, in this illegal transaction. Mamedov allegedly received cash in the amount of $6,000,000 at the bank’s cash desk. The fact that this amount was received is reportedly documented. However, Mamedov allegedly did not stop there and attempted to additionally recover another $10,000,000 from the state-owned bank, relying on his connections in the Prosecutor General’s Office. In court proceedings related to this case, he allegedly received support from the Chairman of the Almaty City Court, T. Barpibaev. Until recently, the bank continued receiving lawsuits from him demanding payment of these funds. The National Bank reportedly appealed to the Prosecutor General’s Office regarding the alleged illegality of Mamedov obtaining this money and his alleged tax evasion, but Mamedov’s alleged supporters in the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Almaty Prosecutor’s Office allegedly concealed these facts. At the time, Mamedov was making efforts to prevent the case from becoming public.

Several offshore companies controlled by Mamedov were reportedly involved in the questionable transaction involving the withdrawal of funds from BTA Bank. Subsequently, as part of this transaction, BTA Bank executives Ablyazov M. and Zharimbetov J., with Mamedov’s alleged active involvement, transferred an asset — the industrial complex of JSC “Semey Su,” which had been pledged to BTA Bank — to an offshore company and sold it, causing significant damage to the bank.

The Heroin “Borman”

Having established such connections within the security services and law enforcement agencies, Mamedov allegedly decided not to limit himself to ordinary corporate raiding and moved on to more profitable activities. According to operational information, Mamedov had for several years been one of the most active participants in drug trafficking across the post-Soviet region. In 2007, following information that Mamedov was actively involved in drug trafficking through Kazakhstan, the KNB Department for the Zhambyl Region opened an operational surveillance case No. 5-116/07 dated June 20, 2007. The materials of the case reportedly revealed clear criminal links between Mamedov and criminal groups controlling drug trafficking.

It was established that Mamedov was connected through friendship with the son-in-law of Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, who, in turn, introduced Mamedov to the son of Nuritdin Rahmon, the brother of the Tajik president. Russian and Uzbek security services reportedly considered him one of the main figures controlling Tajik drug trafficking from Afghanistan. They traveled to Kazakhstan, and a meeting with Mamedov in Almaty was documented. Mamedov allegedly traveled to Tajikistan several times for negotiations; for security reasons, he did not fly directly to Dushanbe but traveled by flight to Tashkent and then continued by car. While tracing the network of Kazakh drug trafficking, investigators determined that Mamedov, together with members of the “Zhambylskie” or “Bashka” organized criminal group, whose leader was the “thief-in-law” Serik Zhamanayev (“Serik-Golova”), crowned in Sochi in 1995, coordinated operations, transit to neighboring territories, cargo transfers, and interaction with other members of the drug trafficking network through Kazakhstan. Mamedov himself was known in the group by the nickname “Borman.” While Zhamanayev was serving time in prison, the main operational work was carried out by “Borman” — Mamedov. He also reportedly visited “Serik-Golova” for consultations. Several meetings between Mamedov and Zhamanayev, whom Mamedov visited in prison, were documented. The visitor log of the correctional facility where Zhamanayev was serving his sentence recorded two visits: April 1, 2009, and November 21, 2009. It also became known that Mamedov, through his connections in law enforcement agencies, attempted to remove certain members of the organized criminal group from operational records and requested the destruction of information about them.

Operational surveillance reportedly recorded that Mamedov met several flights from Dushanbe, where he and his associates received boxes allegedly containing dried fruit. Mamedov’s associates, accompanied by a security service employee, entered the baggage collection area and removed the boxes without inspection, although aircraft baggage was normally subject to inspection. He allegedly helped several times to receive cargo belonging to an individual known as Falu Dushanbinsky, who was an employee of the Tajik Embassy and whom Kazakh security services suspected of involvement in drug trafficking. There were reportedly grounds to believe that Mamedov provided cover for drug transportation by using his connections within the KNB Department in Almaty. This was allegedly confirmed by the termination of an operational case on the instructions of former Head of the Almaty KNB Department, General N. Myrzaliyev, with whom Mamedov reportedly maintained close relations. In addition to Almaty, Mamedov arranged shadow “customs clearance” of goods at the Khorgos customs point, as senior customs officials were also reportedly among his contacts. Through Zh. Ospanov, former Deputy Prosecutor of South Kazakhstan and current Deputy Chairman of the Customs Committee of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Mamedov became acquainted with K. Karbuzov, Chairman of the Customs Committee of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The Heroin "Borman"

Having established such connections within intelligence agencies and law enforcement structures, Mamedov decided not to limit himself to ordinary corporate raiding and moved on to more profitable activities. According to operational information, Mamedov has for several years been one of the most active participants in drug transportation networks across the post-Soviet space. In 2007, after information was received that Mamedov was actively involved in drug trafficking through Kazakhstan, the Department of the National Security Committee (KNB) in the Zhambyl region opened an operational surveillance case No. 5-116/07 dated June 20, 2007. The materials of the case revealed clear criminal ties between Mamedov and criminal groups controlling drug trafficking routes.

It was established that Mamedov had ties with the son-in-law of Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, who, in turn, introduced Mamedov to the son of Nuritdin Rahmon, the brother of the Tajik president. Russian and Uzbek intelligence services consider him to be one of the key figures controlling Tajik drug trafficking from Afghanistan. They reportedly visited Kazakhstan, and a meeting with Mamedov in Almaty was documented. Mamedov traveled to Tajikistan several times for negotiations, avoiding direct flights to Dushanbe and instead flying to Tashkent before continuing by car for security reasons.

While investigating the Kazakh drug trafficking network, investigators allegedly found that Mamedov, together with members of the "Dzhambul" or "Bashka" organized criminal group, led by the "thief in law" Serik Dzhamanaev ("Serik-Head"), who was crowned in Sochi in 1995, coordinated operations, transit routes, cargo transfers, and interactions with other participants of the drug trafficking network through Kazakhstan. Mamedov himself was known in the group by the nickname "Borman". While Dzhamanaev was serving a prison sentence, "Borman" — Mamedov — carried out most of the operational work. He also reportedly visited "Serik-Head" for advice. Several meetings between Mamedov and Dzhamanaev were documented, including visits to Dzhamanaev in prison. The visitor log of the correctional facility where Dzhamanaev was serving his sentence recorded two visits: April 1, 2009, and November 21, 2009. It also became known that Mamedov, through his connections in law enforcement agencies, attempted to remove certain members of the organized criminal group from operational records and have information about them destroyed.

Operational surveillance recorded that Mamedov met a plane from Dushanbe several times, where he and his associates received boxes supposedly containing dried fruits. Mamedov’s associates, accompanied by an intelligence officer, entered the baggage claim area and removed the boxes without inspection, although airline luggage was normally subject to screening. He allegedly helped retrieve cargo belonging to a person known as Falu Dushanbinsky, a Tajik embassy employee whom Kazakh intelligence agencies suspected of involvement in drug trafficking. There were reportedly grounds to believe that Mamedov provided cover for drug transportation using his contacts in the Almaty KNB Department, which was confirmed by the termination of an operational case on the orders of former Almaty KNB Department head General Myrzaliyev N., with whom Mamedov reportedly maintained close relations. In addition to Almaty, Mamedov allegedly ensured the shadow "customs clearance" of goods at the Khorgos customs checkpoint, where senior customs officials were also reportedly among his associates. Through Ospanov Zh., former deputy prosecutor of South Kazakhstan and later deputy chairman of the Customs Committee of the Ministry of Finance of Kazakhstan, Mamedov allegedly became acquainted with Karbuzov K., chairman of the Customs Committee of the Ministry of Finance of Kazakhstan.

According to experts’ estimates, cash flows generated by criminal activity in Khorgos amount to at least $800 million annually. Another route of Mamedov’s alleged drug trafficking network was the Uzbek-Kazakh border crossing. Through Uzbek National Security Service (SNB) employees allegedly corrupted by Mamedov, the cargo was escorted across Uzbek territory. Across Kazakhstan, transportation was ensured by representatives of Kazakhstan’s law enforcement agencies (KNB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs). The goods were then transported into Russia. Approximately 500 kilograms of heroin were transported in a single shipment. A vehicle carrying cargo labeled as food products was reportedly not inspected along the entire route. According to a source within Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, Uzbek authorities had long suspected the Mamedov brothers of links to drug mafias. They allegedly had information that back in the 1990s, Mehti Mamedov and Vitadi Mamedov established a drug transportation channel to Siberian cities under the guise of fruit shipments.

However, Mamedov is now conducting operations on a much larger, international scale. He reportedly traveled to Moscow several times to meet with organizers of drug trafficking networks across the CIS and maintained close ties with criminal leaders of an ethnic Azerbaijani criminal group in Russia. Mamedov also traveled to Amsterdam several times to meet with leaders of a criminal structure controlling the transit of Afghan drugs through Russia into Europe. Beyond the post-Soviet region, Mamedov allegedly transferred profits from his illegal activities abroad. Several offshore companies allegedly belonging to Mamedov were identified, with significant amounts transferred through their accounts for the purpose of laundering illicit funds withdrawn from Kazakhstan through fictitious contracts. According to operational data, Mamedov allegedly established several entities engaged in illegal financial operations involving the conversion of non-cash tenge into cash currency and vice versa. These operations were reportedly carried out through the bank accounts of commercial structures controlled by Mamedov, whose activities were strictly concealed. The entire operation of these "cash-out" companies was personally controlled by Mamedov, with a source reporting cash turnover amounting to several tens of millions of dollars.

Kidnapping as an Argument

Our protagonist does not shy away from ordinary criminal methods either. Thus, last year, with the support of unidentified individuals, Mamedov kidnapped the son of citizen M.A. Amangaliyeva, demanding that she hand over title documents for the subsoil use rights to the “Kardai area” gold deposit and the “Taldy-Ashchesayskoye” aluminum deposit, with a total value of USD 3 million. Amangaliyeva contacted the Almaty Department of Internal Affairs too late, making it impossible to prove the fact of kidnapping and extortion. According to Amangaliyeva, Mamedov threatened her with retaliation and demanded that she withdraw her police complaint. He then filed a counterclaim with the Almaty Department of Internal Affairs, demanding that Amangaliyeva be prosecuted for defamation. It remains unknown how this high-profile story ended, but the methods used by Mamedov are highly revealing.

Entry into the “Family”

Control over drug trafficking, a powerful corruption network involving influential people who could “resolve issues” at the level of the leadership of special services, police, and prosecutors — this might be the ultimate ambition of an ordinary mafia figure. But our protagonist had much greater ambitions. He wanted to resolve matters at the highest level, and for that he needed nothing less than to become part of Kazakhstan’s most important family — the president’s family. This dream took hold of Mamedov as soon as he moved to Kazakhstan. His main goal at the time was to establish close ties with Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev.

Mamedov actively used his connections in law enforcement not only to gain access to Kulibayev. These connections helped him obtain information that he used to blackmail Kulibayev’s associates in the companies KazMunayGas and KazRosGas in order to bring them over to his side. Mamedov also succeeded in pressuring other people close to T. Kulibayev. There is information that some of them paid him settlements. For example, K. Borambayev reportedly paid several million dollars under pressure from compromising material concerning embezzlement at KazRosGas. There is also information that people close to T. Kulibayev, including Kairat Krymov and Kenes Rakishev, paid Mamedov compensation. At the same time, Kulibayev’s circle actively opposed Mamedov and obstructed his attempts to gain the trust of their patron, so he did not achieve much success in this direction.

“Cherchez la femme,” our protagonist apparently remembered and once again changed his priorities. This time, he was much luckier. Through mutual acquaintances who were part of the inner circle of Nazarbayev’s younger daughter Aliya, contact was established. It is said that Mamedov was assisted by the wife of I. I. Rogov, the chairman of the Constitutional Council of Kazakhstan. Although, according to reports, there was still no direct contact, Mamedov already had the opportunity to convey requests through mutual acquaintances of. Well, every journey begins with a first step…

Kidnapping as an Argument

Our protagonist does not shy away from ordinary criminal methods either. Thus, last year, with the support of unidentified individuals, Mamedov kidnapped the son of citizen M.A. Amangaliyeva, demanding that she hand over title documents for the subsoil use rights to the “Kardai area” gold deposit and the “Taldy-Ashchesayskoye” aluminum deposit, with a total value of USD 3 million. Amangaliyeva contacted the Almaty Department of Internal Affairs too late, and therefore it was not possible to prove the fact of kidnapping and extortion. According to Amangaliyeva, Mamedov threatened her with retaliation and demanded that she withdraw her police complaint. He then filed a counter-complaint with the Almaty Department of Internal Affairs, demanding that Amangaliyeva be prosecuted for defamation. It remains unknown how this high-profile story ended, but the methods used by Mamedov are highly indicative.

Entry into the “Family”

Control over drug trafficking, a powerful corruption network involving influential figures capable of “resolving issues” at the level of the leadership of special services, police, and prosecutors — this might be the ultimate ambition of an ordinary mafia figure. But our protagonist had much greater ambitions. He wanted to resolve matters at the highest level, and for that he needed nothing less than to become part of Kazakhstan’s most powerful family — the president’s family. This dream took hold of Mamedov as soon as he moved to Kazakhstan. At that time, his main goal was to establish close ties with Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev. Mamedov actively used his connections in law enforcement not only to gain access to Kulibayev. These connections helped him obtain information that he allegedly used to pressure Kulibayev’s associates in KazMunayGas and KazRosGas in an attempt to bring them over to his side. Mamedov also succeeded in pressuring other people close to T. Kulibayev. There is information that some of them paid him settlements. For example, K. Borambayev reportedly paid several million dollars under pressure from compromising material concerning embezzlement at KazRosGas. There is also information that people close to T. Kulibayev, including Kairat Krymov and Kenes Rakishev, paid Mamedov compensation. At the same time, Kulibayev’s circle actively opposed Mamedov and obstructed his attempts to gain the trust of their patron, so he did not achieve much success in this direction.

When the door was closed, Mamedov apparently decided to enter through the window and changed his priorities. His new target was the president’s brother, Bulat Nazarbayev. However, he also failed to gain his trust. The person who prevented Mamedov from doing so was Edgar Salduzi, a businessman from Bulat Nazarbayev’s circle, who understood perfectly well that if Mamedov gained influence over his boss, Salduzi himself would lose both influence and business. “Cherchez la femme,” our protagonist apparently remembered and once again changed his priorities. This time, he was much luckier. Through mutual acquaintances who were part of the inner circle of Nazarbayev’s younger daughter Aliya, contact was established. It is said that Mamedov was assisted by the wife of I. I. Rogov, the chairman of the Constitutional Council of Kazakhstan. Although, according to reports, there was still no direct contact, Mamedov already had the opportunity to convey requests through mutual acquaintances of Aliya Nazarbayeva. Well, every journey begins with a first step…

Mamedov also did not overlook the eldest daughter of the President of Kazakhstan, Dariga Nazarbayeva. In order to gain access to Dariga, who was actively involved in Kazakhstan’s political and public life, Mamedov established contact with Mirgul Isanova, a member of the organizing committee of the Eurasian Media Forum and a person from Dariga Nazarbayeva’s inner circle. Mamedov began actively courting Isanova — giving expensive gifts and offering overseas holidays. After some time, they traveled abroad together several times. With Isanova’s assistance, he was registered as a guest participant of the Media Forum, and from 2007 his name regularly appeared on the list of delegates. This provided Mamedov with opportunities to establish various contacts and connections. It is said that Mamedov’s persistence could soon bring the long-awaited results. By gaining the trust of another of the president’s daughters, Mamedov would finally open the way to his dream — meeting Nursultan Nazarbayev himself. Well, as the unforgettable son of a Turkish subject might have said in this situation: “With such luck — and still at liberty…”

The investigation used publications by Argumenty Nedeli and the international agency InterRight.

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